Bankruptcy - Reorganizations - Equity Receiverships by Bassuener, Oliver H.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 20
Issue 3 April 1936 Article 4
Bankruptcy - Reorganizations - Equity
Receiverships
Oliver H. Bassuener
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Oliver H. Bassuener, Bankruptcy - Reorganizations - Equity Receiverships, 20 Marq. L. Rev. 156 (1936).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol20/iss3/4
RECENT DECISIONS
BAN1KRUPTCY-REORGANIZATIONS-EQUITY REcEIVERSHiPs.-Three creditors,
with claims in excess of $1,000, filed a petition against the debtor hotel corpo-
ration, requesting reorganization under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act.
The hotel properties of the debtor corporation were under the control of a
receiver appointed to collect rents and profits in a suit begun by a mortgagee to
foreclose. The petitioning creditors set out the appointment of the receiver in the
foreclosure suit as a pending equity receivership sufficient to support the petition
for reorganization. The bankruptcy court dismissed the petition. In re 2168
Broadway Corporation. 11 F. Supp. 404 (S.D. N.Y. 1935). The decision was
affirmed by decree of the circuit court of appeals. In re 2168 Broadway Corpo-
ration, 78 F. (2d) 678 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1935). On certiorari to the Supreme Court,
held, decree affirmed; submitting to the foreclosure receivership was not an act
of bankruptcy and it was not sufficient under the statute as an equity receiver-
ship. Duparquet Huot & Moneuse Co. v. Evans, 56 Sup. Ct. 412, 80 L.ed. 413
(1936).
Section 77B was enacted to eliminate practical difficulties of administration,
with the possible attendant unfair practices, growing out of the older equity
reorganization proceedings. See Sabel, The Corporate Reorganizations Act
(1934) 19 MiNx. L. Rv. 34. The receivers appointed in a consent proceeding
might be favorable to particular groups of creditors and stockholders. Other
creditors might be lulled into inactivity and lose their opportunities to file
involuntary petitions in bankruptcy. Resort to the bankruptcy court left no oppor-
tunity for participation by stockholders. The bankruptcy courts hesitated to en-
force early sales and distributions of assets. Cf. Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U.S.
36, 48 Sup. Ct. 268, 72 L.ed. 457 (1928); May Hosiery Mills v. District Court,
64 F. (2d) 450, 452 (C.C.A. 9th, 1932); Friendly, The Corporate Reorganiza-
tions Act, (1934) 48 HARv. L. REv. 39. Section 77B literally specifies that the
existence of a pending equity receivership or the committing of an act of bank-
ruptcy within the previous four months shall be required to support the juris-
diction of the bankruptcy court on an involuntary petition in a reorganization
proceeding. Section 77B (a), 48 Stat. 913 (1933), 11 U.S.C.A. § 207 (a) (1935).
By text definition the phrase "equity receivership" may be taken to include all
proceedings in which a receiver is appointed by an equity court for any purpose.
1 CLARK, RECEMIVRS, (2d ed. 1929) § 12; Note (1935) 19 MARQ. L. REv. 190.
There has been some opinion among the lower federal courts that "equity
receivership" in Section 77B includes receivers appointed to collect rents and
profits in a foreclosure suit. In re Surf Bldg. Corporation, 11 F. Supp. 295
(E.D. Ill. 1934) in which the foreclosure receivership covered most of the
debtor's assets; In re Granada Hotel Corporation, 78 F. (2d) 409 (C.C.A. 7th,
1935), reversed on certiorari in the Supreme Court, Tuttle v. Harris, 56 Sup. Ct.
416, 80 L.ed. 417 (1936), decided with the principal case.
Taking into consideration the experiences in reorganization before the enact-
ment of Section 77B and the experiences of the bankruptcy courts in working
out liquidation where various kinds of receivers had been appointed, the solution
of the court in the principal case is plausible. In a foreclosure receivership
reorganization is not the primary end sought. See Sullivan v. Rosson, 223 N.Y.
217, 119 N.E. 405, 4 A.L.R. 1400 (1918); cf. In re Draco Realty Corp., 11 F.
Supp. 405 (S.D. N.Y. 1935). Section 3 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act [30 Stat. 546
(1898), 32 Stat. 797 (1903), 44 Stat. 662 (1926), 11 U.S.C.A. § 21 (1926) (1935)],
in declaring the appointment of a receiver for the debtor's property to be an act
of bankruptcy, has been interpreted as excluding foreclosure receiverships from
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the act of bankruptcy category. Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. E. T. Shef-
tall & Co., 53 F. (2d) 40 (C.C.A. 5th, 1931). And while a trustee in bankruptcy
supersedes receivers who have been appointed to conserve or to liquidate assets
of a corporation, it has been suggested that even a trustee in bankruptcy could
not interfere with a receiver put into possession at the request of a mortgagee
in a foreclosure suit. Compare the two cases, Gross v. Irving Trust Co., 289 U.S.
342, 53 Sup. Ct. 605, 77 L.ed. 1243 (1933) and Stratton v. New, 283 U.S. 318, 322,
327, 51 Sup. Ct. 465, 75 L.ed. 1060 (1931).
OLivER H. BASSUENEM.
BLLS AND NoTEs--AccoMmoDATioK CO-MAKERS-SUBROGATION.-The plain-
tiff's husband owed the bank $62,500. The debt was secured by the pledge of
collaterals. To prdcure an extension of time, and to cover depredation in the
value of the pledged collaterals, the debtor executed and delivered to the bank
his note for $15,000, secured by a mortgage on certain of his real estate. The
plaintiff signed the note as a co-maker. She joined in the execution of the mort-
gage. Eventually the plaintiff paid the $15,000 note. Her husband died. The bank
filed a claim against the estate for the balance of the indebtedness. The plaintiff
demanded that the mortgage be assigned to her. When the bank refused to make
the assignment, the plaintiff began this suit for subrogation. The bank contended
that the sale of collateral left a substantial part of the total indebtedness unpaid.
and the bank demanded that the court declare the premises to be a part of the
decedent's estate, free from the lien of the mortgage and subject to the claims
of the decedent's creditors. The trial judge gave relief to the plaintiff. On appeal.
held, judgment reversed; the note was paid and the mortgage satisfied and the
bank was entitled to judgment as requested. Strelitz v. First Wisconsin Nat. Bank
(Wis. 1936) 264 N.W. 649 (three justices dissenting).
The language of the majority opinion is general and cryptic. The court
speaks of the wife's being a party primarily responsible and as such not entitled
to subrogation. Without some qualification by way of reference to the specific
facts in the case that proposition is unsound. There is nothing in the Negotiable
Instruments Law to justify it. By the terms of that act an accommodation co-
maker is a party primarily responsible on the instrument. Wis. STAT. (1935) §
116.01. After the enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Law it has been held
in some jurisdictions that extension of time by the holder to the principal
debtor is no defense to the accommodation co-maker [Union Trust Co. v.
McGinty, 212 Mass. 205, 98 N.E. 697 (1912); Cellers v. Meachem, 49 Or. 186,
89 Pac. 426 (1907)] ; that tender at maturity to the holder thereof by an accom-
modation co-maker, a party primarily responsible, does not discharge the instru-
ment [Jameson v. Citizens Nat. Bank, 130 Md. 75, 99 AtI. 994 (1917)]; that
release of security by the creditor does not discharge the accommodation co-
maker [Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Snith, 59 Mont. 280, 196 Pac. 523 (1921)]. These
decisions do lay down propositions which supersede the traditional rules of
suretyship, the common law rules. Cf. Note (1935) 19 MARQ. L. REv. 122. It is
absurd, however, to generalize from them, and to suppose that since the enact-
ment of the Negotiable Instruments Law these courts pretend to decide that the
law of suretyship no longer applies in the field of bills and notes. See Mueller v.
Jagerson Fuel Co., 203 Wis. 453, 456, 233 N.W. 633, 72 A.L.R. 1059 (1931). The
Wisconsin court has suggested that it will follow what has probably become the
dominant view, that "extension of time" is no longer available as a defense to a
party primarily responsible on a negotiable note, primarily responsible as the
principal debtor or the accommodation party. Rosendale State Bank v. Holland,
